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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the District Court err in refusing to dismiss 
felony charges against the Appellant after he had already 
been tried for a misdemeanor which was part of the same 
criminal episode as the felonies? 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
-v-
NORMAN HAGA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20849 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Norman Haga for 
burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and theft, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as 
amended). A jury found the Appellant guilty following a trial 
on July 30, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, 
Judge, presiding. Appellant was sentenced to 0-5 years for the 
burglary and 6 months for the theft, the sentences to be served 
concurrently at the Utah State Prison. The court also ordered 
these sentences to run concurrently with a one year prison term 
Appellant had been sentenced to after he was found guilty of 
attempted burglary on June 28, 1985, in the Fifth Circuit Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Michael Hutchings, Judge presiding. 
Statement of Facts 
On June 28, 1985 Appellant was found quilty of 
attempted burglary, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a 
bench trial before Judge Michael Hutchings, in the Fifth 
Judicial Circuit Court, the Court concluded that the Appellant 
had attempted to enter or remain unlawfully, with the intent 
to commit a theft, in the building of Dan's Used Cars at 1105 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, at approximately 12:30 a.m. 
on April 2, 1985 (R.42). On July 30, 1985, in a jury trial 
before Judge Scott Daniels in the Third District Court, Appellant 
was additionally found guilty of burglary, a third degree 
felony and theft, a class B misdemeanor. The jury concluded 
Appellant had committed these crimes during the evening of 
April 1, 1985 at Progressive Motors on 877 South Main Street 
in Salt Lake City (R. 7,22-25). 
Appellant was originally charged in a three count information 
with burglary, a third degree felony (Count I), theft, a third 
degree felony (Count II) and attempted burglary, a class A 
misdemeanor (Count III) (R. 7-8) (Addendum A). A preliminary 
hearing on the three offenses was held on April 18, 1985 before 
Judge Paul Grant. At the close of the hearing the Court found 
probable cause to warrant trying Appellant on all three counts. 
The Court subsequently ordered the felony counts bound over to 
District Court for trial, but severed the misdemeanor count, sua 
sponte, and ordered a Circuit Court trial of that count. The 
court severed Count III from Counts I and II because it concluded 
that the misdemeanor and felonies did not comprise a single 
criminal episode (R. 74-5, 108-9). 
On June 20, 1985 Judge Daniels heard and denied Appellantfs 
motion to dismiss the felony counts (R. 47-65) . Appellant 
argued that he had been denied a speedy trial when the felony 
charges were not bound over to District Court due to a clerical 
error. At the close of Appellant's argument, the state raised 
an impromptu motion to rejoin Counts I and II with Count III (R.65). 
At the time, Appellant had no choice but to object to the motion 
because no one at the hearing, including Judge Daniels, had any 
idea why the counts had been severed (R. 66-7). Defense counsel's 
objection concerned the procedural basis for the spontaneous motions-
counsel voiced no objection to the substantive issue of joinder (R. 
42,66). Consequently, the motion was denied based in part on 
defendant's procedural objection (T. 42,43,67). (Addendum B). 
After reviewing the preliminary hearing transcripts, Appellant 
brought a timely motion before Judge Michael Hutchings on the 
morning of the Circuit Court trial (June 24, 1985) to rejoin 
Count III with Counts I and II (R. 108-20). Even though the 
prosecution had moved for joinder at the hearing before Judge 
Daniels on June 20, when Judge Hutchings indicated his 
willingness to grant Appellant's motion, the state objected 
(R.121) and the court denied Appellant's motion (R.122). Trial 
on Count III resulted in a judgment against the Appellant. 
On July 26, 1985 Appellant once again presented a motion 
before Judge Daniels to dismiss the felony charges (R. 70) 
(Addendum c). Defense counsel argued that prosecution of 
the felony counts was absolutely barred by Utah's single 
criminal episode statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-1-401 et seq. 
(1953 as amended). Judge Daniels agreed that Appellant's 
alleged crimes "establish[ed] separate offenses under a 
single criminal episode" (R. 101). The Court nevertheless 
denied Appellant's motion, reasoning that Utah Code Ann. 
§76-1-402(2) afforded the court the power to prosecute the 
felonies, ev^n though improperly severed from the misdemeanor, 
"in order to promote justice"(R. 102) (Addendum c). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it refused to dismiss felony 
charges against the Appellant. Utahfs single criminal episode 
statute barred the statefs felony prosecution once the Appellant 
had been tried for a misdemeanor which, as the District Court 
acknowledged, arose from the same criminal episode as the 
felonies. In denying Appellant's motion to dismiss, the court 
effectively denied Appellant the protection Utahfs statute 
provides against the harrassment that attends senseless and 
wasteful multiple prosecutions. Defense counsel gave the courts 
and the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to join the 
improperly severed counts. The state, and not the Appellant, 
must pay the price for the prosecutor's inability to ensure 
that counts comprising a single criminal episode are jointly 
tried. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO DISMISS FELONY CHARGES AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT AFTER HE HAD BEEN TRIED 
FOR A MISDEMEANOR WHICH WAS PART OF 
THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE AS THE 
FELONIES. 
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The staturory provisions relevant to this appeal are 
Utah Code Ann. §76-l-4( )] ,- 102, and -403 (] 953 as amended): 
76-1-401 "Single criminal episode" defined--
Joinder of offenses and defendants.--In this part 
unless the context requires a different definition, 
"single criminal episode" means all conduct which 
is closely related in time and is incident to an 
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective..., 
76-1.-402. Separate offenses arising out of single 
criminal episode--Included offenses.... 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless 
the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trial s 
for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
s ing1e court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting 
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned 
on the first information or indictment. 
7o-1.-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent 
prosecution for offense out of same episode.--(1) 
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, 
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense 
that was or should have been tried under section 
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution? 
(i I Resulted in acquittal; o: 
( i :i ) Resulted in conviction. - . 
A ! - -
court severe J tue misdemeanor count J < oils t >ie two lelon : .> 
=»]' charaed '•-• i ^ >nqle information, ifter concludino 'he 
A:- defense -t>a..±<.'it the prosecution and the Di 
Court trial Judge all agreed, the preliminary hearing magistrate 
was plainly mistaken in his conclusion. This appeal, therefore, 
does not address whether the burglary, theft and attempted burglary 
charged against the Appellant (see p.2,supar) constitute a single 
2 
criminal episode. The sole issue before this Court is whether 
the trial court, after acknowledging the applicability of 
§76-1-403, erred in failing to dismiss the felony charges 
against the Appellant. 
On a number of occasions during the proceedings below the 
prosecution made statements such as: ,f[I]t was just a 
travesty to sever the counts," (R. 65) "[tJ here are separate 
individuals...therefs different locations...but it all comes 
out of the same criminal episode," (R.66) "I want them [the 
counts] joined, I've always wanted them joined, I filed them 
as a single criminal episode,11 (R. 121). Similarly, the 
District Court Judge at one point stated, "As I read the 
statute 402, whenever conduct may establish separate offenses 
under a single criminal episode, that's clearly the case here." 
(R. 101). It should also be noted that in a typical situation 
the prosecutor wants joinder and the defense wants severance 
of counts; in the present case, however, it was clear that the 
evidence of both the felonies and the misdemeanor would come 
in at both trials to show defendant's intent. 
2 
A comparison of the facts in this case with the facts in State 
v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) (the Court held that a 
defendant who had burglarized both an apartment and a laundry 
room within a single apartment complex had committed separte 
offenses within a single criminal episode) clearly establish 
that the crimes charged against the Appellant constitute 
a single criminal episode. 
-6-
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(2) provides that a defendant. 
must not be subjected to separate trials for multiple offenses 
Jtherwisu i;. oidei t.u promote jusuc:-, i^-i- .: two requirements 
are meT • the offenses must be withi n the jurisdiction 
, 11 1 a: 11: :i :i r :I degree f e 1 o n :i e s 
iiMj C±_a^~. A misdemeanor could have properly been joined for 
trial :r ei.it^irt Cnnrt .. Additionally, ; ;th sides agreed 
t:L * * ro; -e; . ::•'•' • " i s o 
over x. surges : :•  • lecona, the offenses must be 
known to tho oroserutina ittorney it t-ru- t :mo f he defendant 
"hr^e vaunts were filed in a ^in-jb: i: lormat • JI~: (Addendum 
*
:
 • ^  second r^-ju i rement is clear"11" ™.^ + * <• M U S O the 
^ v - ; : ::".!;•• . - . i : :^e 
requirements of ^'ib-i-*-- , and because the preliminary hearing 
magis+-r T"-'• *learlw did n^t sever J he >;oun+^ in 'Tier !tto promote 
J > - - -^  
free from separate triais <:r. those offenses was abrogated. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9(a) (1953 as amended) provides: "A 
felony and a misdemeanor offense may be charged in the same 
indictment or information if: (1) They arise out of a single 
criminal episode; and (2) The defendant is afforded a 
preliminary hearing with respect to the misdemeanor along 
with the felony offense." 
4It should be noted that Utah Code Ann. §76-1-405 (1953 as 
amended) cannot provide a rejoinder to Appellant's present 
argument since the requirements of §76-1-402(2) have been met. 
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When the trial court was faced with Appellant's motion 
to dismiss the felony charges against him, it was presented 
with precisely the scenario laid out by §76-1-403. As 
the District Court trial Judge readily admitted, the felony 
case before it constituted a "subsequent prosecution" that 
should have been a part of the prior misdemeanor prosecution 
which resulted in a conviction (R. 101-02). By the court's 
own implicit admission, the Appellant's prior misdemeanor 
conviction barred the prosecution of the felonies because all 
three charges were part of a single criminal episode. Never-
theless, the court denied Appellant's motion to dismiss. In 
support of its ruling the court reasoned: 
...As I read the statute 402, whenever conduct 
may establish separate offenses under single 
criminal episode, that's clearly the case here. 
Unless the Court otherwise orders to promote 
justice, a Defendant shall not be subject 
to separate trials for multiple offenses. And 
then it gives some conditions. And I think that 
statute applies. I think that ordinarily 
the Defendant would not be subject to separate 
trials if multiple offenses arose under the 
same criminal episode, unless the Court otherwise 
ordered to promote justice. 
...I think I have discretion under this section 
to otherwise order, in order to promote justice, 
and that's what—and that's what I am essentially 
doing. 
(R. 101-02) . This language indicates that the trial judge 
entirely misconstrued which "court" could, on the facts of 
this case, properly order separate trials under §76-1-402(2) 
because it failed to read that provision in light of §76-1-403 
(a). The latter provision states that a "former prosecution" 
will always bar a "subsequent prosecution." when the subsequent 
prosecution was for an offense that was or should have been 
-^ •:: • - >-v, >- • r n ^ ^ . - _ , - <(>) * '' - t - * :<<'^'JUSe 
i,he felonie:- , ... the present case, sroul 1 nave been jomed with 
the misdemeanor for trial and were not, there was nothing the 
' i ^ -..: :>>*'• - i •-• - ' - • -•-: - . - i Ii : i : §76-] - 103 
The preliminary roaring magistrate should have bound over all 
counts rr: tne information. Bu4 he failed to do so. As a 
Circuit. . )U.; a,'< : :io District Court had no choice but to dismiss 
tie felon11" charges because they "should h«rTe been tried" 
magistrate, not rue District Coui T j
 t «.;. , -.ho had ordered 
severance •-:. - K~. l-rif ortunai el y pr.i the prosecution, 
:ourt ' s erroneous severance )rder had been complied wit:. -
•-* i-thout challenge from t-hr orosecut ion-- m«i the misdemeanor 
*o do bat, dismiss -. :u felonies i' could :n.-t enter an ai+--r 
* he far*-
 s e v P r a n c o order, sustain hhe ! wpr .-our* severance 
spoke ciuaii; _ : araitmg §Vu-;-4ui ..*.id in- triui cuui '. completely 
misread the mandate of the statute. 
simple i.vo-rait zest :ei aismissa. JOOS the present yr osocution 
,:r*olw -:• ^omc * -hp offenses -^ f- T^  -e ris»-* to ?'v>' .-
that single criminal episode already gone to trial and resulted 
in a conviction or acquital? If the answer to these two 
questions is yes, then the trial court must dismiss the charges 
before it. In the present case, prosecution of the felonies 
"was or should have been" joined with the trial of the misdemeanor 
because the requirements of §76-1-402 had been met and because 
the preliminary hearing magistrate did not sever the counts in 
order to promote justice. Given these facts, the trial judge's 
hands were tied and he could nothing other than dismiss 
the felony charges against the Appellant. Judge Daniels' ruling 
has clearly undermined the policy and protections furthered 
by Utah Code Ann. §§76-1-401 — 403 . 
While there are no Utah cases announcing the policy 
underlying §76-1-403, from the Appellant's perspective this 
provision amounts to a criminal law analogue to the civil law's 
5 
doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. Issue preclusion, 
or collateral .estoppel, is aimed at precluding the relitigation 
of issues determined by a former verdict and judgment. The 
doctrine of claim preclusion bars the litigation or prosecution 
of matters which the court determines could and should have been 
heard in a former trial. These doctrines will of course be 
applicable in many situations where the constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy is not. The doctrines1 purposes are 
essentially the same in the criminal as in the civil context. 
JUtah Legislative Survey—1975, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 831, n. 301 
indicates that §§76-1-401—405 were drafted in order to improve 
"efficiency in the court system," 
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They provide the courts wit. n powerful tools for halting the 
drain upon finances, time and energy of the parties, and 
prevent the waste of public funds and valuable court time 
in a system plagued by crowded dockets. Especially in 
the criminal context, the doctrines shield criminal defendants 
from prosecutorial harassment. 
In the present case, Judge Daniels' denial of Appellant's 
motion to dismiss subjected the Appellant uo a wide range of 
narassr> * >:~\- r^i. ' .: ^ ::) tl le nx^nns^r- n id emoti :na] 
strain or a^i. i^ing 4 •. ir.ais, wnere the evidence was essentially 
the same, instead of OIIL ; !.o was placed in ;i position where he 
1^ -i red tc • c : %- • l ; " - -
a>^oct^u i .iu irauiiia or two sentencing proceedings rather than 
no. Be,*:: ': :,er:ns of the rubJ.c expense and costs to the 
been co.ao ^ tie
 Ly lai i a^io^ ^ t.ie tri.il court's auniai -J. 
Appellant's .notic. _ J'his Court mubt :orrect such a serious 
Writing in concurrance in Ashe v, Swenson, 3 97 U.S. 453 -
45 4 (19 70) , Justice Brennan said: 
...Givei i tl le tendency of modern criminal legislatioi I 
to divide the phases of a criminal transaction into 
numerous separate crimes, the opportunities for multiple 
prosecutions for an essentially unitary criminal 
episode are frightening. 
In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the 
prosecution, except in most limited circumstances, 
to join at one trial all the charges against a 
defendant which grow out of a single criminal act, 
occurrence, episode, transaction. This "same 
-11-
transaction" test of "same offence" not only enforces 
the ancient prohibition against vexatious multiple 
prosecutions embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
but responds as well to the increasingly widespread 
recognition that the consolidation in one lawsuit of 
all issues arising out of a single transaction or 
occurrence best promotes justice, economy, and 
convenience. 
Although Brennan's "same transaction" test for determining 
what should be joined in a single prosecution has not been 
endorsed as a constitutional imperative by a majority of the 
Court, it is clear that Uath has adopted the standard as a 
matter of local law. As this Court stated in State v. Sosa, 
598 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1979), "[t]he single criminal episode 
statute...requires that when a defendant is brought before a 
court, all offenses arising from a single incident which are 
triable before that court be charged at the same time. If 
separate charges can be joined, they should be joined." 
(emphasis added). Utahfs statute thus mandates that a 
prosecutor join all offenses arising out of the same transaction; 
when the state fails to comply with its duty to join, as it 
did in the present case, then dismissal of all attempted 
"subsequent prosecutions" is required. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests 
the Court to reverse the two district court convictions against 
him and order that the charges be dismissed. 
DATED this Y day of June, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ ° ^ 7 /Qe^r 
NANCY BERGESOJ 
Attorney for/Defendant^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, ' ^ c.-^ "'- / '< -^ y-V , i . r< - ; ^ rt :• that 
four copies of the foregoing* Appel lant_ ' s Brief will be 
delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 2 36 State 
(\v. i •. : •. - Lake < ' this ^ day 
of June, 198n„ 
- < / • ? 
NANCY BERGESON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
''•••'-'' • y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . "t: • ^ : ' s 
day of June, >J86. 
ADDENDUM A 
- 1 4 -
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Screened by: G D'EI.ia 
Ass i g n e d to: G D'E1i a 
BAIL ..J.2.,_BOO...OO_ 
THE STA 
us 
NORMflN HAGA 
OF UTAH 
09/30/59 
Defendant(s) 
(Address/DOB) 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 85FS 07f>9 
The unde rs igned „XJ.iL!l?J-^:_§.LCPD/ Hn-.ia.GkSQ.ri -.... 
under oa th s t a t e s on i n f o r m a t i o n ancT""belief" ' t h a t ' ' ' t he~ l l e7endan t ( s ) 
c o mm i 11 e d the c r i i n es o f : 
COUNT I 
BURGLARY, a Third Degree Felony, at 877 South Main Street, in Salt 
I.-ike County, State oi: Utah, on or about April 1, 1985, in 
isolation of -itle 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code 
/^Q A n n o t a t e d 19 5 3, as a in e n ci e d , i n t hat t h e d e f e n d a n i , NORMA M 
^ HAGG, a party to the offense, entered or remained 
V u P 1 auif u 11. y i n t h e b u i 1 d i n g
 0 f P r o g r e s s i u e M o t o r s w 11 h t h e 
i ntent to cornrnit a theft; 
(Con t i n ue d o n page Two) 
This information is based on evidence 
obtained from the following 
witnesses: 
J Longson C Lyman 
K Jones Larry Mathie 
frank Fife Clark Kramer 
Authorized For presentment and 
filihg : 
A f f i a n t 
Su bs c ribecl..* an ci.vswjjx^-~t o 
b e f o rfi&jsnfl A: h is." ^ S _ d a y 
o/ $4^H*985-
County Attorney 
Deputy 
INFORMATION 
STATE us. NORMAN HAGG 
County Attorney #8b~l~66230 
Page Two 
85FS 07f>9 
COUN 
THEF 
T I I 
T, a Th"ircl Degree Felony, at 877 South Main Street, in Salt take 
County, State of Utah, on or about April 1, 1985, in 
v 1 o 1 a 11 o n o f T i 11 e 7 6 , C h a p t e r 6 , S e c t i o n 4 0 4 , U t a h C o cl e 
A •) n o t a t e d 19 5 3, as a in e n cl e cl, i n t h at the d e f e n cl a n t, N 0 K MAN 
HA GG, a p a r t y t o t h e o f fense, o b t a i n e d or e x e r c i se d 
11 n a u 111 o r i z e d c o n t r o 1 o u e r the property o f P r o g r i» s s i u e 
Mo tor s , w i t h t he purpos e to depriue the owner t hereof , an(J 
that the ualue of said property was more than $2E>0.00, but 
n ot mo re than $ 1,000.00; 
COUNT III 
ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 1105 South Main Street, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about April 1, 
19R5, in violation of Title 7 6 / Chapter 6, Section 202, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, NORMAN HAGG, a party Lo (..ho offense, attempted 
enter or remain unlawfully in the building of Dan's Used 
Cars with the intent to commit a theft; 
PROBABLE 
Affiant 
I , i c>8b 
Mu I. or s UJ 
less I: h a 
Officer, 
was seen 
building 
property 
show on April 
as Prog res s i u e 
CAUSE STATEMENT: 
bases this Information on police reports which 
;U 877 South Main Street, a business known 
s broken into and taken was property valued at $250.00 and 
*
 l
 , 0«) 0,00. I n t e r u i e w w i t h C o r e y L y in an, a Sal t L a k e P o 1 i c e 
stated on same date at 110.S South Main Street, defendant 
on an air conditioner and appeared to be breaking into a 
known as Dan's Used Cars. On booking the defendant, 
taken at Progressive Motors was found on his person. 
ADDENDUM B 
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l \ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STAFF Ob" UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
PIa i ntiff, : 
CASE NO. CR-85-673 
vs . : 
NORMAN HAG A, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came before this Court for a 
hearing on defendant's Motion to Dismiss on July 2 6, 1935. 
Both ccurioel for the State and defendant were present, and after 
argument the Court found the following facts and conclusions 
of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant was originally charged with three counts 
in a single Information containing two counts of Burglary -
one a Third Degree Felony and the other an Attempt, a Class 
A Misdemeanor; as well as one count of Theft, a Third Degree 
Felony; ail alleged to have occurred on or about April 1, 1985. 
2. At the prel nr.inary hearing the Honorable Paul G. Grant, 
Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit Court, severed the one count of 
Attempted Burglary, a Class A Misdemeanor, from the remaining 
counts of Burglary and Theft. 
STATE V, HAGA PAGS TWO FINDINGS be CONCLUSIONS 
3. The defendant, with counsel, was before this Court 
on June 2«J, 1985, at 2:00 p.m., arguing a Motion to L.smiss 
on the basis of lack of a speedy trial. At that time the defendant's 
at torn-ay stated, among other things, that it was error for the 
count'- to have been severeu at the Circuit Court level. 
4, The State, through Gerry D'Elia, at the end of the 
proceeding moved the Court for a formal joinder of offenses 
pursuant to Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 402, Utah Code Ann., 
1953 as amended. At that time, the Court asked the defendant 
if there vjas any objection to the joinder, and defendant through 
counsel Nancy Bergeson objected to the Motion on the ba^is of 
lack o': notice. Based upon defendant's objection and in the 
interest of justice, the State's Motion for joinder of offenses 
was deni ed. 
5* Defendant xas then tried in Circuit Court on one count 
of Attempted Burglary, a Class A Misdemeanor. As a result, 
he was found guilty, 
6. That defendant, through counsel Bergeson then came 
back on July 26, 1985, and asked this Court to dismiss the remaining 
felony Burglary and Theft cases, reasoning that the defendant 
had aLready been to trial on the misdemeanor charge, whrch precluded 
a subsequent trial on the felonies. 
STATE V. {i\G*\ PAGE THREE BINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Motion by the State to join the offenses was properly 
made before this Court, although actual 'written notice was not 
prepared . 
2. Mot ice to the defendant was adequate because the defendant:, 
through counsel, agreed that tne cases should have remained 
joined. 
3, This Court denied the State'-s Motion to join based 
on defense counsel's objections. 
4, This Court ordered that the State's Motion for joinder 
be deniai in order to promote justice. Therefore, ace-, .ding 
to Section 76-1-402(2), Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, the 
defendant was properly allowed separace trials on the offenses, 
although they might have arisen from the same criminal episode. 
Dated this ^ day of Ai^ gus't, 1985. 
C. WY ' 0 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. D I A O N HiVuJLSY 
/'" \ C«/»'fc 
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NANCY BERGESON (#303) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lc'ke Legal Defendant Assoc 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Salt 
JUL 1,9 1985 
H. Dixon Winery £ l e r K 3rd Diet. Court 
}eou\y C«6rK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
NORMAN HAGA, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO DISMISS, AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS, 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. CR85-673 
(Judge Scott Daniels) 
Defendant, NORMAN HAGA, by and through his counsel, 
NANCY BERGESON, hereby moves this Court to bar the prosecution 
of the above-entitled case and dismiss the same under the authority 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-1-403 (1) (1953 as amended). 
Defendant has previously been prosecuted for an offense 
arising out of the same criminal episode as the two offenses in 
this case. (See attached affidavit) The subsequent prosecution 
is barred because the offenses should have been tried in the same 
prosecution. See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (1953 as amended) 
Defendant therefore seeks dismissal of this case. 
DATED this / / day of July, 1985. 
VNCY BEROES0N 
Attorney for Defendant 
N O T I C E O F H E A R I N G 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above entitled matter will come on regularlv for hearing on 
the 26th dav of Julv, 1985, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. before 
the Honorable Scott Daniels, Third District Court Judge. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this / / day of July, 1985. 
fete* 
Attorney for/Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this // day of July, 19 85. 
t 
-2-
NANCY BERCESON (#303) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff, : 
-v- : 
NORMAN HAGA, : Case No. C£ Q5-1? 13 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I NANCY BERGESON, being first duly sworn and upon my oath 
do depose and state that the following facts are true and correct 
to the best of my knowledge and belief: 
1. I represented Norman Haga on his charge of Attempted 
Burglary, Case No. 85FS0769, set in front of the Honorable Michael 
Hutchings, on June 24 & 28, 1985; 
2. On June 24, 1985 prior to trial, I objected to the 
severence of the Attempted Burglary from the two felony counts pending 
before this Court on the basis that all three offenses were part of 
a single criminal episode; 
3. The County Attorney, Gerry D'Elia, had previously ex-
pressed his belief, to both this Court and the Circuit Court, that 
the offenses were part of a single criminal episode; 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sr»t i ^ - County, Utah 
JUL 1:9 1985 
HD.xonJI .nM/Cierk j rd Diet Court BV • A) ^ 
1/ 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
4. Based on both parties positions regarding the issue 
of joinder. Judge Michael Hutchings offered two options; 
5. One, that the case proceed to trial; 
6. Two, that the case be joined with the two felonies 
pending before this Court; 
7. Judge Hutchings asked Mr. DfElia if he would consent 
to a joinder of the offenses; 
8. Mr. D'Elia answered he would not and was desirous of 
proceeding immediately to trial. 
9. Defendant was convicted of Attempted Burglary, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended). 
DATED this / / day of July, 1985. 
NANCY BERGESQlfi 
Attorney for Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /3- day of July, 
1985. 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
i/jp.7^U 
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